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1 With the aim of enrolling every Indian resident, the Aadhaar program, overseen by the
Unique  Identification  Authority  of  India  (UIDAI),  has  been  promoted  in  official
discourse as a transformative tool for eliminating “duplicates and fake identities” and
ensuring transparency in welfare and service provision to authenticated individuals.2
Nandan Nilekani, widely regarded as the architect of Aadhaar, has declared that the
national biometric-based identification scheme has saved the Indian government $9
billion in “fraud and wastage.”3 This emphasis on ensuring authenticity was similarly
deployed three years before the creation of the UIDAI and four years before the first
Aadhaar  number  was  issued,  in  another  Indian  unique  identification  project  with
strong  connections  to  Aadhaar.  Known  as the  National  Skills  Registry  (NSR),  this
database,  launched  in  2006  by  the  Indian  information  technology  (IT)  industry’s
employer association, NASSCOM,4 utilizes biometric identification to create individual
profiles of current and potential IT employees.
2 With estimated annual revenue of over 123 billion GBP (NASSCOM 2018), the Indian IT
industry  is  largely  populated  by  college-educated  professionals  with  relatively
substantial  salaries,  middle-class  lifestyles,  and  opportunities  to  travel  and  work
abroad.5 An exploration of practices and policies in the IT industry might therefore
appear somewhat removed from an analysis of Aadhaar, which lays particular emphasis
on  the  efficient  delivery  of  welfare  schemes  and  subsidies  targeted  at  the  poor
(Nilekani  and  Shah  2015).  Yet,  even  a  relatively  superficial  investigation  reveals  a
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number of  material connections between the IT industry and the Aadhaar program.
Perhaps the most obvious is Nilekani himself. Nilekani, the first Chairman of the UIDAI,
is  one  of  India’s  most  famous  IT  entrepreneurs,  having  co-founded  the  country’s
second-largest  IT firm, Infosys.  The expansion of  Aadhaar’s  focus towards linking a
range  of  public  and  private  services  to  this  unique  identification  number  has  also
resulted  in  the  creation  of  the Indian  Software  Products  Industry  Round Table,  or
iSPIRT. This entity, which describes itself as a think tank, is primarily staffed by former
members  of  NASSCOM,  and  provides  technological  tools  for  the  incorporation  of
Aadhaar into the provision of these services, as well as lobbying on behalf of businesses
that utilize Aadhaar (Thaker 2018).6 
3 Beyond these direct linkages, strong parallels to the Aadhaar program can be seen in
the proliferation of the NSR. This IT employee database and its vision of safeguarding
authenticity have  been  endorsed  by  Nilekani  in  his  2014  book,  Rebooting  India,  co-
written with another key Aadhaar engineer, Viral Shah (Nilekani and Shah 2015:252).7
More broadly, in its attempt to re-invent itself as a “start-up state” (Nair 2019), the
government’s increasing reliance on neoliberal techniques of governance in the pursuit
of its development agenda reminds us that “the private sector often provides the model
for efficiency” (Rao and Nair 2019:471) for state practice. 
4 This paper presents an analysis of the NSR, which, operated by the country’s largest
private-sector employer, provides a useful comparative framework for evaluating the
trajectory and scope of Aadhaar. In particular, by focusing on the industry’s attempt at
disciplining  its  workforce  through  the  use  of  biopower  (Foucault 1978),  this  paper
recalls Foucauldian arguments in existing scholarship on the application of Aadhaar in
managing  targeted  populations  (Chaudhuri  and  König 2018;  Maringanti 2009;
Sarkar 2014). While the surveillance of employees in both conspicuous and subtle ways
is commonplace in the industry (Upadhya and Vasavi 2006), I argue that this has been
reinforced  by  the  discourse  of  “integrity”  that  is  frequently  deployed  to  manage
employees. The NSR, as a centralized repository of employees’ personal, professional
and biometric information, becomes a crucial site of enforcing “integrity,” allowing
companies to not only mark compliant employees as legitimate, but to also potentially
contain acts of resistance. 
5 In the remainder of this paper, I contextualize the study by drawing from literature on
surveillance, particularly as a corporate disciplining technique, and the growing body
of scholarship on identification systems, citizenship and civil liberties in India. I also
provide an overview of the Indian IT industry, the NSR, and the methods used for this
study.  I  then  interrogate  the  surveillance  culture  of  the  IT  industry  and  analyze
“integrity,” or compliance with corporate policies, as a disciplining strategy. Placing
the NSR within this framework, I highlight the similarities of the NSR with Aadhaar,
while also exploring the emergence of the “NSR blacklist,” a rumored compilation of
deviant employees in the NSR visible only to employers. In deconstructing the myth-
making, misconceptions and self-disciplining generated by the existence of the NSR, I
comment on Aadhaar’s implications for safeguarding individual privacy, the power of
private players under neoliberal capitalism and the increasing ubiquity of surveillance
strategies in everyday practices.
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Situating Corporate Surveillance and Unique
Identification Databases 
6 This empirical study of the NSR and its socio-political implications draws on the rich
body  of  scholarship  on  techno-social  identities  (Amoore 2006;  Lyon 2009,  2001;
Rose 1999). This research argues that biometric verification systems, operating in the
interest  of  both public  agencies and private capital,  assume that identity is  located
within a stable body that can be easily legitimated (Amoore 2006). In the process, these
programs create  fixed categories  that  particularly  favor  state  interests  over  citizen
needs (Lyon 2009). Rose (1999) highlights the potential for these systems to result in
modes  of  exclusion  that  are  often  predicated  on  existing  lines  of  identity  and
difference.8 Moreover,  Rose  addresses  the  scope  of  surveillance  through  unique
identification. In the “securitization of identity,” as Rose argues, the objective is not to
administer  constant surveillance,  but  to  provide  “ conditional  access  to  circuits  of
consumption and civility” (Rose 1999:243). Much of this work builds on, critiques and
develops  Foucault’s  influential  formulations  on  governmentality  and  bio-power
(Foucault 1991,  1978).  Foucault’s  theory  of  governmentality,  or  the  institutional
governance  of  a  population through strategies  that  aim to  foster  a  culture  of  self-
discipline,  has  provided  an  important  conceptual  framework  for  unpacking
surveillance  mechanisms.  Similarly,  the  “anatomo-politics”  (Foucault 1978)  of  bio-
power—aimed  at  influencing  individual  behavior  by  operating  on  and  through
biological  characteristics  of  discrete  bodies—allows  for  further  theorization  on
biometrics as a tool for enforcing productivity through compliance.
7 This  paper  also  adds  to  the  diverse  body  of  literature  on  corporate  strategies  for
controlling  and  managing  employees  (Freeman 2000;  Kunda 1992;  Ong 1987;
Salzinger 2000; Upadhya and Vasavi 2006).  Ong (1987),  in her classic study of female
factory workers in Malaysia, found that these women were often referred to as “factory
daughters,” emphasizing their subordinate status to paternalistic male managers while
simultaneously  desexualizing  them.9 In  his  study  of  software  engineers  in  Silicon
Valley, Kunda (1992) has identified how “normative control” is deployed to maximize
productivity. Kunda (1992) defines this as “the desire to bind employees’ hearts and
minds  to  the  corporate  interest”  (p.217).  This  normative  control  is  seen  in
decentralized practices that encourage employees themselves to be invested in this
process.  He  notes  that  alongside  these  modes  of  normative  control,  “utilitarian”
methods based on vertical operations of power are also prevalent. Moreover, Kunda has
observed that the construction of subjectivities within Silicon Valley occurs through
both the acceptance and the contestation of these power structures, as employees do
not  unquestioningly  imbibe  this  logic  of  control.  In  their  study  of  the  Indian  IT
industry, Upadhya and Vasavi (2006) found a similar blending of extreme “panoptical”
systems of control with subjective management techniques, with companies sometimes
attempting to create a “fun” atmosphere in order to mask the rigidity, monotony and
stress of their work processes.
8 Turning to unique identification as a site of analysis, a robust body of literature has
emerged in recent years in response to the state’s adoption of biometric-based systems
of  verification.  Much  of  this  scholarship  has  emphasized  the shift  in  state-subject
relations that both arises from and has contributed to the implementation of Aadhaar
(Abraham 2018; Chaudhuri  and  König 2018;  Maringanti 2009;  Rao  and  Nair 2019;
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Shukla 2010). The state’s framing of its operations in the language of the market has led
to  a  “bureaucratic—technocratic—entrepreneurial  model  of  development”  (Rao  and
Nair 2019:474) that closely resembles the structures of the service industry. Within this
discourse, residents are framed as “customers” who avail of the government’s services,
which are delivered partly in collaboration with private sector resources (Chaudhuri
and König 2018:127–128).  The  transactional  nature  of  Aadhaar,  where  the  state  has
emerged as a “mediator and facilitator” of the market (Shukla 2010:31), has profound
implications for residents’ interactions with state apparatus.
9 This  literature  also  explores  the  intended  and  material  operation  of  Aadhaar.
Sarkar (2014)  delineates  the  principles  behind the  program,  arguing that  its  binary
distinction between legitimate applicants for entitlements and purported pretenders
results in the formulation of a “static” system that leaves little room for unforeseen
deviations  from  this  model.  Simultaneously,  as  other  studies  have  highlighted
(Nair 2018; Rao 2013), a number of contradictions have become visible in the program’s
actual implementation, as systems of marginality and exclusion find continuities in its
execution.
10 The potential for Aadhaar to be utilized by the state as a mode of surveillance has also
been  commented  on  in  recent  scholarship  (Khera 2019;  Ramanathan 2010).  This
research delves into the concept of data “convergence” (Ramanathan 2010). It argues
that  Aadhaar,  once  “seeded”  into  a  number  of  other  public  and  private  databases,
would allow for privacy infringement and individual profiling, with consequences for
those  posing  resistance  to  the  state.10 In  the  context  of  South  Africa’s  unique
identification system, HANIS, Breckenridge (2005) has similarly discussed the privacy-
related consequences of “data-creep,” or the ability of a biometric-based identification
program to enable the building of individual resident profiles.
11 Moreover,  a  growing  body  of  literature  has  utilized  ethnographic  methods  to
interrogate  the  social  meanings  of  surveillance.  Prasad-Aleyamma (2018)  notes  that
technology  utilized  for biometric  identification  is  not  merely  a  transformative
surveillance  mechanism.  Rather,  surveillance  through  technology  must  also  be
conceptualized as a consequence of  complex and variegated socio-political  strategies.
This research  also  addresses  the  performativity  of  negotiations  with  biometrics
(Rao 2018;  Solanki 2019).  Solanki (2019),  in  his  study  of  the  role  of  biometric
identification in evaluating government employees in a North Indian state, notes that
attempts  at  managing  this  workforce  result  instead  in  the  “performance  of
management.”  Rao’s (2018)  analysis  of  two  disparate  physical  sites  that  utilize
biometric identification reveals that contrary to their portrayal as a means of fixing
identities,  biometric systems are open to manipulation, including by those they are
meant  to  control  and  categorize.  This  paper  contributes  to  this  scholarship  by
providing  a  situated  analysis  of  an  industry-specific  surveillance  mechanism,  using
ethnographic methods to highlight the constructed nature of surveillance itself.
 
Field Site and Methodology
12 The birth of the Indian IT industry can be traced to the early 1970s, when the central
government first began to promote software exports and the inclusion of computer
science courses in higher education institutions (Heeks 1996). In 1984, the government
under then-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi released a “Computer Policy” that officially
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recognized  software  as  an  industry  (Parthasarathy 2005),  with  subsequent  policies
further easing restrictions for investors. The launch of the Software Technology Parks
of India (STPI) in 1991—a government organization that provides IT companies with
well-equipped physical spaces for conducting business—allowed foreign companies to
offshore  their  software  and  services  requirements  directly  to  Indian  sites,  while
domestic  companies  also  benefited  from  the  availability  of  suitable  infrastructure
(Upadhya and Vasavi 2006). Combined with the economic reforms of the 1990s,11 which
significantly reduced barriers to the inflow of foreign capital, and the availability of a
technically-educated, relatively cheap, English-speaking labor force, the path was set
for the rapid growth of the industry. 
13 The  IT  industry  has  demonstrated  a  particular  reliance  on  foreign  clients
(Chandrasekhar 2005;  Kumar 2005).  As  Patibandla,  Kapur  and  Petersen (2000)  have
argued, the very foundation of the industry was built on exports,  which has deeply
influenced its institutional growth. Moreover, the industry has received considerable
state  support  since  its  inception,  with  both  the  central  and  state  governments
providing numerous incentives to encourage its expansion. In turn, the industry has
demonstrated  its  ability  to  exert  influence  over  policymaking  (Parthasarathy 2005);
NASSCOM  which  was  founded  in  1988,  played  a  key  role  in  establishing  the  STPI
(Upadhya and Vasavi 2006). 
14 Software and services companies have begun to contribute significantly to Chennai’s
economy  in  recent  years,  operating  alongside  more  established  industries  such  as
automobile and electronics manufacturing, healthcare, and financial services. As one of
India’s  largest  IT  centers  and  the  capital  of  the  southeastern  state  of  Tamil  Nadu,
Chennai has witnessed rapid urban development over the last decade to accommodate
and facilitate the expansion of the industry. Most major Indian and foreign companies
operating in India are represented in sprawling, self-contained office complexes and IT
parks dotted throughout the city. Tamil Nadu has nearly 600 engineering colleges, with
around 250,000 new students entering these institutions every year (Government of
Tamil Nadu 2015). There are also several arts and science colleges that feed into the
industry. The availability of a large pool of potential employees can be viewed as a
major reason for the expansion of the IT industry in the city. 
15 This paper derives from a broader research project that analyzed the construction of
middle-class subjectivities through employment in Chennai’s IT industry. Between 2015
and 2016, I spent nine months conducting fieldwork in Chennai, where I interviewed IT
employees, managers, and executives, some of whom were NASSCOM office-bearers. I
also spoke with a number of people indirectly connected to the industry, such as union
leaders, labor activists, diversity and recruitment consultants, and bureaucrats. While
gaining extended access  to companies  proved to be difficult,  I  was able  to  conduct
ethnographic  observation  in  spaces  associated  with  the  industry,  such  as  IT
conferences.  Moreover,  for  this  paper,  a  detailed  reading  of  reports  issued  by  the
government and by NASSCOM, and of the NSR website, in particular, informs much of
the analysis. With a view of documents as “‘social facts’ [that are] produced, shared and
used in socially organized ways” (Atkinson and Coffey 2010:79), triangulating interview
and observation  data  with  documentary  analysis  provided deeper  insights  into  the
implications of the industry’s adoption of a unique identification system for employees.
16 Before proceeding, a brief overview of the NSR is called for. The NSR is now used by
most major IT firms in the country (although it has not been uniformly adopted across
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the industry),  with 341 companies having subscribed to it  thus far,  according to its
official website.12 While not all of my respondents had registered with the NSR (and a
few were not even aware of its existence), all of my younger informants at major IT
firms had been required to do so. Major companies such as Infosys, Wipro and Tata
Consultancy  Services  have  made  registration  compulsory  as  a  pre-condition  of
employment.  There  are  currently  over  2.6  million  individuals  registered  in  the
database, of whom over 1.7 million have submitted their biometric information. 
17 Registration with the NSR consists  of  two stages:  first,  employees  must  fill  out  the
registration form on the NSR website, where they are required to provide information
including  their  present  and  previous  addresses,  phone  number(s),  father’s  name,
mother’s maiden name, spouse’s name, passport information and PAN card13 details
(provided  the  employee  is  in  possession  of  these  documents),  along  with  their
educational  and  employment  histories.  Following  this,  they  must  visit  a  “Point  of
Service” (POS),14 where they are required to pay the registration fee,15 provide photo ID
for verification of their profiles, and submit their fingerprints. While the NSR website
does not mention this, two of my respondents also claimed to have had their retinas
scanned for additional biometric information. Once these steps have been completed,




18 The extent of direct, visible surveillance within the workspaces of the IT industry is
striking,  perhaps  reflective  of  the  broader  trend  towards  the  rise  of  routinized
surveillance  in  modern  society  (Lyon 2001).  When  visiting  IT  offices  to  conduct
interviews, I was generally required to pass through multiple layers of security before
being allowed in. I was usually asked to enter my name, whom I was there to meet and
which “company” I was from in a log book, and was often asked to surrender my laptop
before entering the premises. At some companies, a sticker was pasted over my phone
camera.  One  of  my  respondents,  Murali,17 an  employee  at  a  mid-sized  company
described the level of protection around these companies as being akin to a fort in the
Chola Empire.18 I was told that this level of scrutiny was required to prevent data theft
and keep confidential material secure, as companies often handle sensitive information
for their clients.
19 These  surveillance  techniques  also  manifest  in  more  subtle  forms,  having  become
embedded in the work culture of the industry (Upadhya and Vasavi 2006), with a host
of  actors  having  been  co-opted  into  the  process  of  surveilling  each  other  and
themselves.19 Besides managers and IT employees, this includes administrative, security
and  cleaning  staff.  I  met  one  of  my  informants,  Sonam,  at  an  IT  park  where  her
company was located. A busy HR executive, Sonam suggested I interview her in the
building’s food court, to avoid having to surrender my laptop and cell phone. Yet, a few
minutes after opening my laptop, I was told by a member of the cleaning staff that it
was not allowed on the premises and was made to put it away.
20 Similarly, the use of identity cards by employees to “swipe-in and swipe-out” of offices
demonstrates the level of daily scrutiny that they are placed under. Employees wear
their  ID  cards  around  their  necks,  or  clipped  to  their  belts,  which  they  scan  at
automated turnstiles before entering or leaving their office premises. This process is
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not only meant to prevent “outsiders” from freely entering these complexes, but also
allows companies to maintain a record of the number of hours employees have spent at
work,  which  can  then  be  linked  to  employee  appraisals.  The  declaration  by  two
different executives that their companies “study” employees in a “360-degree” manner
during  these  appraisals,  underscores  the  importance  placed  on  an  overarching,
panoptical  view  of  employees.  Some  companies  have  also  introduced  written
examinations  as  part  of  their  appraisals,  thereby  informing  employees  that  their
productivity is being surveilled, scrutinized, and, literally, tested. 
21 With the aim of maximizing productivity, these strategies of surveillance have given
rise  to  a  discursive  construction  referred  to  as  “integrity.”  Specifically  aimed  at
fostering  a  culture  of  discipline  in  the  IT  workforce,  the  idea  of  “integrity”  (or  a
perceived lack thereof), was explained to me by Pranav, a software developer at a major
company: 
They keep sending flyers [email notices] on two things. One is on workplace
harassment, and the other is on integrity. You shouldn’t wear someone else’s
ID card and swipe it at the office, or if you take leave, you should update it.
The company calls  these  administrative  issues  “integrity,”  and they keep
updating us on that [emphasis added].
In this context, “integrity” refers to employee adherence to corporate policies aimed at
creating  a  disciplined  workforce.  While  the  promotion  of  integrity  is  undoubtedly
connected  with  a  broader  emphasis  on  productivity,  I  would  argue  that  it  must
nevertheless be conceptualized as a distinct construct. Within the language of integrity
is  encoded  the  insidious  message  of  employees’  untrustworthiness.  As  a  result,
employees who conform to companies’  disciplining strategies are marked as having
integrity;  conversely,  acts  of  resistance  can  be  framed  as  demonstrating  a  lack of
integrity.  In  a  climate  where  IT  professionals  have  slowly  begun to  take  collective
action against employers (Shakthi 2018), the discursive binary of compliant/disruptive
mediated  through  the  deployment  of  “integrity”  imbues  companies  with  further
authority to censure employees. Thus, we observe that subversive behavior aimed at
resisting corporate hegemony can be co-opted by those in power to further their own
agenda (Gupta in Elias 2005:213).
22 The use of “integrity” to either legitimize employees, or to depict them as unreliable,
irresponsible or deceitful, has, in turn, allowed companies to adopt more forceful and
visible disciplining practices. For example, when I spoke to Uttara, a software engineer
at an offshore support center for a major bank, she began to tell me about a “resting
room” at her office, where she went to lie down when she was feeling tired during both
her pregnancies. As she recounted,
Initially when I was pregnant, I didn’t have to tell my managers or anything.
I just had to tell the security staff to open the room [when] I needed to rest,
and I had to enter [my details] in the register. It was initially like that. Later
on, they changed the process. Prior to taking even a nap, I have to send an
email to my manager, who sits in Hyderabad, he has to approve it, and then I
have to show that letter to the security people, then only they will open it.
Uttara was thus required to receive an official authorization to utilize this facility from
her manager, who works in a different city. When I asked her why this change had been
implemented, she mused that people might “misuse” the resting room. Here, we can
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observe  the  complex  interplay  between  discipline  and  integrity,  with  more  severe
policies being justified as preemptive measures to counter a perceived lack of integrity.
 
Verifying Integrity
23 The NSR, as a centralized database that categorizes employees as verified professionals,
might be viewed as a crucial site for crafting “integrity.” According to the NSR website,
the purpose of the database is as follows:
National Skills Registry is a NASSCOM initiative to have a robust and credible
information infrastructure about all persons working in the industry. This
develops  trusted  and  permanent  fact  sheet  of   information about  each
professional along with background check reports. This is a security best
practice for  the  industry  and  assures   identity  security,   [and]  industry
acceptance to [sic] honest professionals [words in bold in original].20
Like  Aadhaar,  the  NSR  emphasizes  uniqueness,  robustness,  credibility,  and
permanence: a single, verified profile that will last one’s entire lifetime. Consequently,
one of its key “benefits,” as listed on its website, is that it “creates an environment of
discipline” [emphasis added].21 In the case of the NSR, both companies and employees
have  the  option  of  carrying  this  verification  forward  further  through  background
checks  on  the  information  listed  in  employees’  profiles,  which  are  conducted  by
“Empaneled Background Checkers”  (EBCs).  These  EBCs  are  private  data  verification
companies that have been authorized by NASSCOM to undertake this task. The EBCs
employ  a  range  of  verification  methods;  the  employee’s  listed  current  address,  for
example, is verified by a member of the EBC physically travelling to the address, while
educational qualifications are cross-checked against listed educational institutions. If a
background check is conducted, the results will be officially recorded in the employee’s
profile.22 
24 As with Aadhaar,  the purpose of  the NSR is  not  simply to establish the identity of
prospective or current employees, but to authenticate, and therefore legitimize, the
identity they claim to occupy (Nayar 2012:17). The concern over fake credentials is a
prevalent discourse in the industry; in their book, Shah and Nilekani claim that a fifth
of resumes circulating in the IT industry are fake (Nilekani and Shah 2015:249).23 The
NSR website insists that registration allows employees to “join the league of registered
and trusted professionals,” which will eliminate the risk of “other persons with fake/
inflated details” vying for the same positions.24 This recalls the focus of Aadhaar on
preventing  fraud,25 as  asserted  by  the  UIDAI,  which  identifies  challenges  in  the
execution of welfare schemes being largely due to the pervasiveness of “fake and ghost
identities.”26 Through this emphasis on accreditation through biometric identification,
the NSR is used to ensure that the “integrity” of the IT workforce is maintained. 
25 Moreover, the IT industry’s anxieties over upholding “integrity” seem to stem, at least
in part, from the industry’s relationship with foreign clients. This is articulated
explicitly  in  multiple  places  on  the  NSR  website.  Explaining  why  the  project  was
launched, the NSR website laments that the absence in India of a “central and public
database  of  its  citizens” is  a cause for concern for the industry’s “global  clients”
[words in bold in original].27 By compiling this information, the stated purpose of the
NSR is to establish the credibility of the Indian IT workforce, thereby assuring clients
that their sensitive data will be protected.28 Falling within the spectrum of “biopolitical
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strategies  that  categorize  modern  bodies”  (Harcourt 2009:21),  the  NSR’s  use  of
biometric  data is  its  trump card,  ensuring employee uniqueness,  and consequently,
“integrity,”  in  the  global  marketplace.  The  establishment  of  the  NSR must  also  be
considered in the context of the industry’s importance in the Indian economy. While no
comprehensive data protection law currently exists in India,29 a set of rules30 prescribed
by the central government for corporations outlines security and privacy guidelines for
“sensitive” data such as biometric information. Yet, the actual practices that companies
adopt to collect this data have thus far escaped scrutiny, with the NSR being projected,
much like Aadhaar, as merely a “technical solution to the problem of uncertainties of
identity”  (Sarkar 2014:525).  The ability  of  NASSCOM, a  trade association for  private
companies,  to  collect  biometric  information  from  employees  and  store  this  in  a
centralized  database,  brings  to  mind  Ong’s  theory  of  “graduated  sovereignty”
(Ong 2006). As Ong has noted, “governments adjust political space to the dictates of
global capital, giving corporations an indirect power over the political conditions of
citizens” (Ong 2006:78).  Thus,  any ethical  consideration of  the NSR appears to have
been overlooked to accommodate the demands of the transnational capitalist system. 
 
Enforcing Integrity
26 When asking my respondents about the NSR, a number of them, primarily those who
were active in the IT unions that have recently emerged in the city, mentioned an “NSR
blacklist.” Discussions on social media and online forums reveal that this “blacklist,” or
the “blacklisting” of employees on the NSR, is also debated among broader sections of
the IT workforce. Yet, none of my respondents were willing to definitively confirm that
an actual blacklist even existed, or that they could provide proof to this effect. The
process of blacklisting was, instead, visualized as the addition of a “black mark” to an
employee’s NSR profile by their company, or, alternatively, of placing the employee
and their NSR profile on a virtual “blacklist.” In this narrative, employees would not be
aware that they had been placed on a “blacklist.” This was envisioned as a mechanism
through which employers could inform other registered companies that a particular
employee  had exhibited  transgressive  behavior  (the  nature  of  which was  itself  not
clearly defined), effectively rendering them unemployable. 
27 Certainly, there are other aspects of the NSR that plainly reveal the power imbalance
between  employers  and  employees  in  the  industry.  If  a  company  has  lodged  a
complaint  with  the  police  or  has  initiated  court  proceedings  against  an  employee
registered in the NSR, for example, the database permits the company to mention this
on the employee’s profile, even if a verdict has not been arrived at.31 In contrast, the
disciplinary  force  of  the  blacklist  emerges  from  uncertainty;  with  the  truth  of  its
existence remaining unclear, the nature of indiscretions that could potentially result in
being  placed  on  the  blacklist  has  also  been left  unspecified.  Thus, rather  than the
blacklist itself, the fear of being blacklisted appears to be more compelling within the
wider framework of  the NSR and employee integrity.  My discussions with IT union
leaders in Chennai revealed their concerns that some employees’ anxiety over being
placed on the blacklist was contributing towards preventing them from participating in
collective action. In my conversation with Hemant and Venkat, both members of a local
IT union, they expanded further on the imagined utility of the NSR for employers in
creating compliance within the workforce:
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Venkat:  They  [companies]  access  NASSCOM’s  database,  so  they  check  if
everything you say is true, using their data. The big fear everyone has is, if
they find out they are in a union, they will  blacklist  them, so when they
apply to another company, there will be a problem—their whole life will be
ruined […]
Shakthi: But is there proof that they are blacklisting?
V: No, that fear is there. But they are definitely maintaining a database.
Hemant: A lot of HR managers tell their employees, “Your name will be
included in the blacklist.” When they say something like that, we can’t get a
hard copy of proof. But people say this happens in a lot of places...Suddenly,
one fine morning, if they are given a pink slip, and they no longer have that
salary, they can’t even imagine that. They can’t survive for even one week,
and they can’t join another job. So, with that fear alone, these companies
control everything.
We  observe  through  these  statements  that  the  actual  existence  of  the  blacklist  is
irrelevant  to  its  utility  as  a  disciplining  mechanism.  Through  the  creation  of  this
centralized employee repository,  the industry is  imbued with the ability  to  control
employees  through nothing  more  than the  perceived risk of  sanction.  As  Murali,  a
software  engineer  at  a  mid-sized  company  and  a  member  of  another  IT  union
explained, “How they threaten is, we are all one entity. Anywhere you go, we will find
you out. They say that at the beginning itself, we will check all this.” This is not to
suggest that such efforts have gone unchallenged, with the “blacklist” being discussed
as a possible site for collective action by all the IT union leaders I spoke with. In effect,
the  ambiguity  around  the  list  has  overshadowed  the  NSR  itself  as  a  source  of
contestation within the “new regimes of surveillance” (Rao 2018:69) facilitated by the
emergence of biometric verification.
28 The possibly mythical  existence of  the blacklist,  viewed through the lens of  fraud/
integrity,  presents  an  important  site  for  understanding  how  Aadhaar  might  be
deployed to manage residents. While thus far, there does not appear to be a construct
commensurate with the NSR blacklist that has been generated by the introduction of
Aadhaar,  it  nevertheless  holds  the  potential  to  give  rise  to  a  similar  system  of
intimidation,  partial  information  and  centralized  control  (Khera 2019).  As  Aadhaar
continues to seep into deeper corners of everyday life, we might note that, as with the
NSR  blacklist,  the  fear of  censure  through  surveillance  alone  might  emerge  as  an
increasingly visible tool for curbing dissent against the state. 
 
Conclusion
29 This  paper  utilizes  the  framework  of  the  National  Skills  Registry,  a  centralized,
permanent database that aims to collect and compile data on Indian IT employees, to
comment on the possibilities for unique identification systems to influence their target
populations. It analyzes the discourse of “integrity” in the Indian IT industry, situating
it within its entrenched culture of surveillance. This discursive construction classifies
employees as either legitimate inhabitants of  IT workspaces,  or as  unsuitable to be
engaged in IT employment. Mediated through the NSR, “integrity” becomes a quality
that can be catalogued and verified. The threat of being placed on the NSR “blacklist,”
an  unconfirmed  compilation  of  disobedient  employees,  exposes  the  fundamental
challenge  to  civil  liberties  contained  within  systems  such  as  Aadhaar.  What  forms
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might the discourse of “integrity” assume in the state’s narratives around authenticity
and fraud?  As  this  paper  has  argued,  the  very  existence  of  databases that  operate
through  the  centralization  of  information  can  result  in  forms  of  self-disciplining
through the fear of exclusion.
30 The  state’s  shift  towards  operating  like  a  “platform”  for  the  delivery  of  services
contingent on Aadhaar verification shows strong parallels with IT-based configurations
(Rao and Nair 2019). Indeed, given the critical role of prominent members of the Indian
IT industry in the Aadhaar project, the structures and practices of the industry have
undoubtedly influenced the formulation and implementation of  Aadhaar.  Moreover,
the existence of the NSR itself is representative of the power of private capital in the
new economy, and of the interconnected nature of state-market relations, with the IT
industry  being  a  particularly  influential  player  in  this  setting.32 The  government’s
attempts  at  linking  all  essential  services,  whether  public  or  private,  to  Aadhaar,
underscores the influence of market concerns in its implementation. 
31 The possibility  of  Aadhaar  serving  as  a  tool  for  surveillance,  and to  discipline  and
manage residents,  must  then be contextualized within the wider system of  techno-
social formations in Indian society. Both the NSR and Aadhaar are part of a range of
public and private biometric techniques in India that include fingerprinting technology
to mark attendance in private companies (Rao 2018) and the impending launch of the
world’s  largest  facial  recognition  system  by  the  country’s  crime  data  bureau.33 As
biometric  data  collection  becomes  ubiquitous  in  the  lives  of  Indian  residents,
ethnographic  studies  that  pay  attention  to  its  everyday  practices  are  crucial  for
understanding its socio-political implications. While the potential for “data-creep” is
clearly embedded in Aadhaar, this paper moves beyond the materiality of surveillance
to interrogate specific forms of discursive control. Using the NSR as its site of analysis,
it demonstrates how the language of surveillance both shapes and is constructed by the
structures within which it operates. Thus, by placing Aadhaar within this framework,
we  can  locate  new,  situated  configurations  of  the  broader  culture  of  techno-
surveillance.
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NOTES
1. I am grateful to Professor Pier Giorgio Solinas for organizing the panel at ECSAS in 2018 that
provided the initial impetus to write this article, and the other participants for their feedback
and comments. I would also like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their suggestions. I
must, of course, thank my respondents for their time and generosity.
2. Unique  Identification  Authority  of  India.  “About  your  Aadhaar”:  https://uidai.gov.in/my-
aadhaar/about-your-aadhaar.html.
3. Surabhi  (2017):  https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/aadhaar-has-helped-govt-
save-9-b-from-being-lost-to-fraud-wastage-nilekani/article9902030.ece.
4. National Association of Software and Services Companies.
5. Here, I refer primarily to the sectors of the industry devoted to software development, testing,
support and maintenance, as well as to knowledge process outsourcing work, which constituted
the main sites of my study. My study did not include the segments of the industry focused on call
center support and related back office services.
6. The 2018 ruling by the Indian Supreme Court on the constitutionality of  the Aadhaar Act
decreed that private corporations should not be given access to Aadhaar data. However, new laws
passed in 2019 have allowed companies to use Aadhaar for authentication, provided individuals
give their consent. At the time of writing, the constitutional validity of the new legislation is
being  challenged  in  the  Supreme  Court.  See  Rautray  (2019):  https://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/sc-notice-on-plea-challenging-law-on-
private-entities-using-aadhaar/articleshow/72192940.cms.
7. Moreover, one of the registrars authorized to collect residents’ data for Aadhaar is a central
securities depository known as the NSDL, a subsidiary of which manages the NSR database for
NASSCOM.
8. For a detailed analysis of how the mechanics of biometric identification itself can be fallible,
see Magnet (2011).
9. Salzinger (2000) demonstrates in her study of a Mexican maquiladora that sexual desire, and
the consequent sexualization of surveillance, became an actual “force of production” that was
embedded in the factory’s relations of power.
10. Concerns over privacy and surveillance have also attracted a significant amount of interest in
popular  writing.  See  Shukla  (2018):  https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-
nation/aadhaar-verdict-why-privacy-still-remains-a-central-challenge/articleshow/
65970934.cms;  Datta  (2017):  https://scroll.in/article/832592/the-end-of-privacy-aadhaar-is-
being-converted-into-the-worlds-biggest-surveillance-engine;  Dixit  (2017):  https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/pranavdixit/one-id-to-rule-them-all-controversy-plagues-
indias-aadhaar; Sethi  (2017):  https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/despite-govt-
denials-states-building-databases-for-360-degree-profiles-of-citizens/story-
qnSLHGyZIXiZiO4ce84UuO.html.
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11. See Corbridge and Harriss (2008) for an analysis of the impact of the 1991 economic reforms
on the Indian economy.
12. National Skills Registry. “Homepage”: https://nationalskillsregistry.com.
13. In India, a PAN, or Permanent Account Number, is a unique identifier issued by the Indian
government’s  Income  Tax  Department  to  tax-paying  individuals  or  entities  for  financial
transactions. Those in possession of a PAN number are given a PAN card, which is considered a
valid identity document.
14. There are several of these verification centers in every city with a major IT presence; some
companies also have their own POS booths within their premises.
15. The registration fee is currently Rs.400. It is expected that employees will then pay a further
Rs.100 every year to renew their membership, although this is not enforced.
16. Registered employees  can only  view their  own profiles  and do not  have access  to  other
registrants’ information. An employer can view the profiles of registered employees at their own
company, as well as the profiles of other IT professionals who have granted them access (which
might happen, for example, if they are hoping to procure a job at the authorized company).
17. All respondents have been given pseudonyms.
18. The Chola dynasty was at its peak between the tenth and twelfth centuries CE, when it ruled
large parts of South India, as well as regions in neighboring countries, such as Sri Lanka, and was
known for its military might.
19. Executives themselves can, at times, feel surveilled. Sriram, an executive at a major ITES
company, while speaking to me about his company’s diversity initiatives, reflected on how his
own diversity-related actions were constantly being watched and judged by his employees: “I am
sitting in [my office] like I am a zoo exhibit, except for that kind of opaque stuff [indicates the
frosted glass wall]. I’m exhibit number one.” 
20. National  Skills  Registry.  “Companies  /  NSR  Benefits”:  https://nationalskillsregistry.com/
companies-nsr-benefits.htm.
21. National  Skills  Registry.  “Companies  /  NSR  Benefits”:  https://nationalskillsregistry.com/
companies-nsr-benefits.htm.
22. National  Skills  Registry.  “Knowledge  Professional  /  Background  Verification”:  https://
nationalskillsregistry.com/background-verification.htm.
23. The NSR website refers to this as the “menace of bloated resume’ [sic] and ‘CV faking’.” See
National  Skills  Registry.  “Companies  /  FAQs”:  https://nationalskillsregistry.com/faq-for-
companies.htm.
24. National  Skills  Registry.  “Knowledge  Professional  /  Participate  in  NSR”:  https://
nationalskillsregistry.com/companies-participating-in-nsr.htm.
25. As Cohen (2019; 2017) has argued, “de-duplication,” rather than service delivery itself, is the
central aim of Aadhaar.
26. Unique Identification Authority of India. “Frequently Asked Questions”: https://uidai.gov.in/
286-faqs/your-aadhaar/aadhaar-features,-eligibility.html.
27. National  Skills  Registry.  “National  Skills  Registry  /  NSR  Context”:  https://
nationalskillsregistry.com/nsr-context.htm.
28. It is interesting to note that while concerns over the leakage or misuse of Aadhaar data have
attracted  both  media  and  scholarly  attention,  the  stated  purpose  of  the  NSR  is  to  prevent
precisely this sort of data breach for clients.
29. At the time of writing, the Personal Data Protection Bill, a proposed piece of legislation that
would provide a legal framework for data privacy and security in India, was being discussed in
Parliament.
30. These are the Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and
Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011, notified under the Information Technology
Act, 2000.
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31. National  Skills  Registry.  “National  Skills  Registry  (NSR)  Tour  for  Subscriber  Companies”:
https://nationalskillsregistry.com/doc/nsrtour-subscribercompanies.pdf.
32. The NSR website states that the industry has agreed to extend the NSR to the country’s
banking  and  finance  sectors.  See  National  Skills  Registry.  “About  Us”:  https://
nationalskillsregistry.com/aboutus.htm.
33. The National  Crime Records  Bureau has  recently  issued a  tender  to  launch the National
Automated Facial Recognition System. The aim of this project is to combat crime and collect
evidence by collating facial  images from a range of  sources,  including government agencies,
CCTV footage and newspapers.
ABSTRACTS
Supporters of Aadhaar, the unique identification scheme that aims to use biometric information
and  a  12-digit  number  to  catalogue  every  Indian  resident,  have  often  commented  on  the
tremendous amount of “fraud” that this program has curtailed since its introduction nearly a
decade ago. Four years before the first Aadhaar number was issued, this discourse of ensuring
authenticity  was  similarly  deployed  by  the  Indian  information  technology  (IT)  industry’s
employer  association,  NASSCOM,  which  inaugurated  its  own unique  identification  project  to
verify  potential and  current  employees.  Known  as  the  National  Skills  Registry  (NSR),  this
database utilizes biometric identification to create individual profiles of IT employees, each of
whom is assigned a unique number called an ITPIN.
In  this  paper,  I  draw  on  interview  and  observation  data  collected  during  nine  months  of
fieldwork  in  Chennai’s  IT  industry,  as  well  as  a  detailed  analysis  of  industry  reports  and
documents,  to  dissect  employee  and  corporate  narratives  on  the  NSR.  I  interrogate  the
overarching discourse of employee “integrity” operating within the industry to deconstruct the
myth-making, misconceptions and self-disciplining generated by the existence of this database.
As  a  result,  I  provide  a  comparative  framework  through  which  to  conceptualize  Aadhaar’s
implications for safeguarding individual privacy, while also commenting on the power of private
players under neoliberal capitalism and the increasing ubiquity of surveillance strategies in the
lives of Indian residents. 
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